One of my strongest takeaways from #Gastech in Bangkok was just how difficult the LNG market has become to forecast.

In the “old days”, the debate was often around variations on a broadly similar central outlook. At Gastech, I heard credible arguments for three more divergent futures: significant LNG oversupply; continued geopolitical fragmentation and high prices; or a highly disrupted future where the security assumptions underpinning the global LNG trade break down.

Current pricing is driving a glut of new liquefaction capacity – with the IEA estimating 345bcm/year of new liquefaction will be added between 2025 and 2030 (IEA) from Qatar, the US and others. All of this comes as the industry grapples with ever-growing geopolitical risks.

As both Qatar and Russia would attest, the value of reserves and assets plummets if the physical routes needed to develop and export them are constrained. At the same time, buyers will quickly balance their energy portfolios if they foresee growing risks.

Based on conversations at Gastech I developed three scenarios for what might come next?

Scenario 1. Open and Abundant LNG

The first scenario sees current conflicts gradually subside. Maritime security improves, Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb stabilise and the post-WWII international system continues broadly to support open trade, freedom of navigation and international investment.

Qatar progresses its North Field expansion, US capacity grows and other new volumes enter the market, turning today's apparent scarcity into abundance.

The challenge then shifts from securing LNG to finding markets for it. Prices could fall significantly in the short to medium term as supplier competition increases. Portfolio optimisation, market access, efficient use of receiving infrastructure and new demand creation would become the major commercial priorities.

There could also be consequences for the energy transition. Cheap gas may slow the economics of electrification in some markets. Governments would return to being less willing to pay large security premiums for alternatives that can support supply security.

In an extreme version of this scenario, even some questions that currently appear politically settled could be reopened. With peace, some may argue for a return of Russian gas to Europe in the form of LNG or even piped gas, adding yet more supply to an already well-supplied market.

Fundamentally, open and abundant LNG returns the industry to a world in which efficiency, markets and commercial optimisation matter most.

Scenario 2. Politicised LNG

The second scenario looks more like an extension of current conditions. The core elements of the post-WWII liberal international system continue to exist, but increasingly through political compromises and workarounds.

International LNG trade continues, but becomes progressively less global and more bloc-based. Political alignment increasingly influences where cargoes move, driven by new visions of counterparty and market reliability. Russia, Iran, North Korea and China cooperate more closely in some areas; the US and its allies strengthen their own relationships; while a new group of “middle powers” seek to trade with each other.

Conflicts, sanctions and tariffs affect trade routes. Carbon and methane regulations create new barriers. Governments intervene more. Shipping and insurance costs rise. The result is a less efficient global LNG market in which geopolitics and regulation increasingly shape commercial outcomes.

This scenario could support the highest sustained global LNG prices until buyers move away, with continued inter-basin competition for volumes, while supply from Russia and the Gulf remains constrained.

Elements of this are already becoming visible, with EU sanctions on Russian LNG, trade wars impacting LNG contracting, direct attacks on LNG carriers and regas terminals and the proliferation of interconnected conflicts across regions and maritime theatres.

This is a world where navigation becomes as important as optimisation. At Gastech, it was clear that LNG players are diverging in their response, with some focused on new global commercial models, while others are seeking stronger regulatory & geopolitical capabilities.

Scenario 3. Security-Constrained LNG

The third scenario sees conflicts persisting or expanding, international cooperation weakening and maritime chokepoints becoming recurring sources of disruption.

In the age of abundant, cheap drones, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez, the Eastern Mediterranean and potentially Malacca become much harder to secure. In this world, global shipping can no longer be considered to provide a reliable backbone of inter-basin trade.

This also challenges an old assumption upon which LNG suppliers built their reputations. When I worked in Qatar, one of the recurring messages I wrote into speeches for our CEO was that LNG had an important security advantage over pipelines. A pipeline depends on a fixed route, while LNG provides buyers and sellers with access to multiple markets and suppliers. We joked about “Gucci Gas” in the form of global LNG value chains vs. high street supply.

That logic still holds, but recent events have exposed vulnerabilities on both the pipe and LNG sides. Nord Stream and attacks on Saudi Arabia's East-West Pipeline highlight the risks facing pipeline infrastructure. Attacks affecting LNG facilities, including Damietta and Ras Laffan, and vessels such as the Arctic Metagaz, illustrate previously unforeseen risks for LNG buyers.

The sad conclusion is that in 2026, neither pipelines nor LNG sit safely outside geopolitical conflict. In this scenario, the critical questions become more fundamental than price and flexibility. How much LNG is physically accessible, from where, through which route, and how reliable is it?

A cargo behind a closed chokepoint is not economically equivalent to one in the Atlantic Basin. A liquefaction plant repeatedly exposed to attack is not equivalent to one operating in a secure jurisdiction. An import terminal supplied through a single maritime corridor is not as resilient as genuine route diversification. Contracts concluded with some jurisdictions bring higher risk than dealing with others.

This weakens the concept of a single global LNG market and may lead to regional or “bloc-based” pricing, increased investment in alternatives, greater government intervention and stronger incentives to use energy produced closer to home.

Furthermore, it has political consequences. Earlier, the stable-abundance scenario highlighted how Russian gas might eventually return because relations improve. In a security-constrained LNG scenario, the same outcome could conceivably be driven by the opposite pressure, as a policy response to insecure global LNG supplies.

What does all this mean for the LNG market?

While nobody knows which scenario will prevail, the industry still needs to contract, recruit and plan.

In my view, each scenario shifts the relative importance of different capabilities:

  • Open and Abundant LNG: markets, commercial strategy and optimisation.
  • Politicised LNG: markets, regulation, policy, risk management and geopolitics.
  • Security-Constrained LNG: markets, policy, security and physical resilience.

Given this, perhaps the LNG team of the future looks a bit different.

Traditional LNG market analysis remains essential, but increasingly it should be overlaid with deep policy, geopolitical & resilience expertise. Several conversations at Gastech suggested that this kind of expertise is already difficult to source and increasingly in demand.

For my own part, Gastech reminded me just how dynamic LNG markets have become with genuine potential for abundance, political fragmentation or security-driven constraints.

Whilst we cannot confidently predict the outcome, companies need to reflect on the current realities and start building strategies and capabilities that work across all three.